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Abstract
Background: In rebuilding devastated health services, the government of Afghanistan has provided access to basic
services mainly by contracting with non-government organisations (NGOs), and more recently the Strengthening
Mechanism (SM) of contracting with Provincial Health Offices. Community-based information about the public’s
views and experience of health services is scarce.
Methods: Field teams visited households in a stratified random sample of 30 communities in two districts in Kabul
province, with health services mainly provided either by an NGO or through the SM and administered a questionnaire
about household views, use, and experience of health services, including payments for services and corruption. They
later discussed the findings with separate community focus groups of men and women. We calculated weighted
frequencies of views and experience of services and multivariate analysis examined the related factors.
Results: The survey covered 3283 households including 2845 recent health service users. Some 42% of households
in the SM district and 57% in the NGO district rated available health services as good. Some 63% of households in
the SM district (adjacent to Kabul) and 93% in the NGO district ordinarily used government health facilities. Service
users rated private facilities more positively than government facilities. Government service users were more
satisfied in urban facilities, if the household head was not educated, if they had enough food in the last week, and
if they waited less than 30 minutes. Many households were unwilling to comment on corruption in health services;
15% in the SM district and 26% in the NGO district reported having been asked for an unofficial payment. Despite
a policy of free services, one in seven users paid for treatment in government facilities, and three in four paid for
medicine outside the facilities. Focus groups confirmed people knew payments were unofficial; they were afraid to
talk about corruption.
Conclusions: Households used government health services but preferred private services. The experience of
service users was similar in the SM and NGO districts. People made unofficial payments in government facilities,
whether SM or NGO run. Tackling corruption in health services is an important part of anti-corruption measures in
Afghanistan.
Background
Public health services in Afghanistan were in near total
collapse in 2001. Services have since improved, but much
remains to be done [1,2]. A household survey in 2006 indi-
cated improvements in under-five and infant mortality
rates compared with figures from 2000 [3]. A key focus
has been on improving access of the population to basic
health services. The government developed a Basic Pack-
age of Health Services (BPHS) in 2002, revised in 2005 [4],
and arranged access to these basic services mainly through
contracting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
provide the services, in collaboration with donor partners
[2]. Subsequently, under a scheme known as the Ministry
of Public Health Strengthening Mechanism (MOPH-SM),
the central MOPH contracted Provincial Health Offices
(PHOs) to provide the BPHS in some provinces, in the
same way as NGOs were awarded contracts [2]. In 2007,
an estimated 82% of the population lived in districts
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necessarily mean that 82% of the population actually had
access to or used health facilities providing the BPHS [2].
According to official policy in 2008, services in govern-
ment health facilities (including those run directly by the
MOPH, and those provided under contract by the SM or
by a contracted NGO) were provided free of charge.
Given the difficult security situation in many parts of the
country, reliable representative community-based data
about use and experience of health services in Afghanistan
are hard to collect. Most of the information about the
functioning of the health services is facilities-based (col-
lected from the facility staff and records and from the
users of the facility). Repeated cycles of a survey of facil-
ities across the country have shown improvements over
time in many functions and in staff views and experience,
as well as high and improving ratings of the service from
patients using the facilities [5]. However, a 2006 review of
progress in health services pointed out that having facil-
ities on the ground and able to provide the BPHS does not
mean that everyone has access to or chooses to use these
services, and concluded that “Research at the community
and household level is very important to determine other
reasons why some people do, and others do not, make use
of the health services available” [
2]. The people who do
not make use of available public health services are often
the most disadvantaged.
In order to provide information about the use and
experience of health services from the viewpoint of house-
holds, in 2008 the government of Afghanistan, through
the MOPH, commissioned a demonstration social audit of
health services in two districts, both in Kabul province. In
the first district (the NGO district), in the north of the
province, the district hospital and most of the five basic
health centres (BHCs) were run by a contracted NGO. In
the second district (the SM district), adjacent to Kabul
city, the two comprehensive health centres (CHCs) and
most of the BHCs were run under the MOPH-SM
scheme. This paper describes the social audit process, its
findings, and their implications for service provision. We
discussed the findings with stakeholders in Afghanistan
soon after the data collection and analysis but they have
not been previously published.
Methods
The Institutional Review Board of the MOPH reviewed
the project proposal and gave ethical approval in May
2008 (ref 244874).
The sample
In consultation with the MOPH, we purposively selected
two districts for the demonstration social audit, one
with government health services run by a contracted
NGO (the NGO district) and one with these services
run by the Provincial Health Office contracted to do so
under the Strengthening Mechanism (the SM district).
Both districts are in Kabul province, and the SM district
is adjacent to Kabul. The NGO district covers some
1200 sq Km and the SM district some 2500 sq Km. A
group drawn from the project steering committee and
district representatives estimated 35% of the population
in the SM district and 10% in the NGO district lived in
urban communities, with a small nomad population in
each district. The group updated the list of communities
in the two districts and categorised each one as urban
(including semi-urban), rural or nomad. We drew a stra-
tified random sample of 15 communities from each dis-
trict: one nomad community for each district; five urban
communities in the SM district and two in the NGO
district; and nine rural communities in the SM district
and 12 in the NGO district.
In each sample community, the field team surveyed
around 120 contiguous households having at least one
child under the age of five years. Radiating from a ran-
domly selected starting point, they visited households
until they reached the target number. There was no sub-
sampling within the sites.
To ensure the sample proportions of urban and rural
(including nomad) reflected those estimated in the
population, we calculated site weights and applied these
when calculating district estimates.
Instruments and data collection
We developed the instruments for the survey based on
priority issues identified by the MOPH. We translated
them into Dari and Pashto, with back translation to
check for any loss of meaning during translation. The
household questionnaire included questions about demo-
graphics and socio-economic status of the household. It
enquired about perceptions and use of health services
(government and other) and asked the most recent ser-
vice users (or someone answering on their behalf, espe-
cially for children) about their experience of the service
most recently used, including waiting times, availability
of medicines, and payments. We did not ask whether ser-
vice users had previously used any other health service
for the same problem. We piloted the questionnaire in
non-sample urban and rural settings in and around
Kabul, and made minor adjustments to improve interpre-
t a t i o na n df l o w .T h ef i n a lv e r s i o ni n c l u d e du pt o9 4
i t e m s( i nm o s tc a s e sl e s st h a nt h i s )a n dt o o ka b o u t3 0
minutes to administer.
A three day training for two field teams in each dis-
trict included classroom sessions and field practices with
the instruments. Data collection took place from July to
August 2008. Security guards accompanied each field
team to the survey sites. Th e yw e r ef a m i l i a rw i t ht h e
local areas, and they guided the field teams to reach the
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communities.
In November 2008, after preliminary analysis of find-
ings from the household survey, we developed a guide to
feedback and discuss findings from the household survey
with separate focus groups of men and women. Trained
teams returned to all the 30 communities of the house-
hold survey and facilitated separate male and female
focus group discussions in each community: a total of 60
groups, each with 8-10 participants, mainly from among
the households covered in the household survey. In each
group a trained reporter made notes of the discussion in
Dari, later expanded as necessary in discussion with the
group facilitator.
Analysis
Data entry relied on Epi-Info ,t h ep u b l i cd o m a i nd a t a
entry and analysis package. Double data entry and verifica-
tion of discordant records minimised key-stroke errors.
Further cleaning looked for logical inconsistencies and out
of range responses. Analysis relied on CIETmap open
source software that combines epidemiological analysis
with raster and vector mapping [6]. Initial analysis gener-
ated weighted frequencies of the main indicators about
perceptions, use, and experience of health services. The
analysis of experience and perceptions of recent service
users focused on those who had visited a health facility
within the last six months. Further analysis examined fac-
tors related to outcomes of interest, in bivariate analysis
and then in multivariate analysis using the Mantel Haens-
zel procedure [7] with an adjustment for clustering
described by Gilles Lamothe, based on a variance estima-
tor to weight the Mantel Haenszel odds ratio for cluster-
correlated data [8,9]. Multivariate analysis began with satu-
rated models including all variables potentially associated
with the outcome, and stepped down to final models
including only variables that remained significantly asso-
ciated with the outcome. Initial models for outcomes for
households included: age, sex, and education of the
respondent; education of the household head; poverty sta-
tus of the household (whether they had enough food in
the last week); urban or rural location; and district. Initial
models for outcomes for service users included: age and
sex of the service user; poverty status of their household;
government or private facility; urban or rural location; and
district. When there was important heterogeneity between
districts we undertook separate models for each district.
Associations are expressed as the adjusted Odds Ratio
(ORa) and its cluster-adjusted 95% confidence interval
(CIca).
A small group including Dari speakers reviewed the
focus group reports, identified recurring themes in the
discussions, and extracted relevant quotes.
Results
The trained field teams collected data from 1639 house-
holds in the SM district and 1644 households in the
NGO district. Table 1 shows household characteristics in
the two districts. In the NGO district, there were more
rural households, household heads were less educated
and households were poorer.
Household perceptions of quality and corruption in
health services
Figure 1 shows the household perceptions about available
health services in the two districts. Household ratings in
the NGO district tended to be more positive than in the
SM district but the difference between the two districts
in the proportion of households rating health services as
good or very good was not significant at the 5% level. In
the SM district, in the final multivariate model, house-
holds reporting enough food in the last week (i.e. not the
poorest households) were more likely to rate available
health services as good, compared with households with-
out enough food in the last week. This effect was stron-
ger in rural areas (ORa 3.95, 95% CIca 1.94-8.06) than in
urban areas (ORa 2.10, 95% CIca 1.08-4.08). In the NGO
district, none of the household level variables was signifi-
cantly associated with the household rating of available
health services, nor was there a significant difference
between urban and rural sites.
Focus groups of men and women voiced a number of
complaints about health services available to them,
including lack of access to facilities, lack of medicines
and equipment, and poor treatment in facilities.
“What can I say, sister? Everybody is treated badly at
government hospitals.” (Female group, the SM district)
“I went to the hospital but the doctor told me he did
not have the equipment to check my blood pressure.”
(Female group, the NGO district)
Figure 2 shows household perceptions of changes in
health services in the last 12 months. Respondents in the
SM district were significantly less likely than respondents
in the NGO district to think health services had
improved in the last 12 months (ORa 0.48, 95% CIca
0.31-0.73). In the SM district, in multivariate analysis, in
rural sites only, households with enough food in the last
week were more likely to think health services had
improved (ORa 3.49, 95% CIca 2.50-4.88) as were house-
holds where the head had some education (ORa 1.69,
95% CIca 1.21-2.37). In the NGO district, only one factor
remained in the final model; households in urban areas
were more likely to think services had improved than
those in rural areas (ORa 2.01, 95% CIca 1.35-2.99).
Focus groups of men and women in the two districts
confirmed the findings from the household survey. Most
groups in the SM district considered services had
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were more mixed.
“Health facilities are deteriorating on a daily basis.”
(Male group, the SM district)
“The attitude of doctors has considerably improved
now. They examine us better as well.” (Female group,
the NGO district)
About half the household respondents in both districts
said they would be willing to pay, or to pay more, for
improved health services: 52% (836/1595) in the SM dis-
trict, and 46% (722/1573) in the NGO district. Multivariate
analysis in both districts indicated that less poor house-
holds were more likely to be willing to pay for improved
services; in the SM district, households with enough food
in the last week were four times more likely to be willing
to pay (ORa 4.55, 95% CIca 2.75-7.53) and in the NGO dis-
trict households with enough food were also more likely to
be willing to pay (ORa 1.62, 95% CIca 1.02-2.59).
Table 1 Characteristics of the sample households in the two districts
Characteristic Fraction (weighted %) of households
SM District NGO District
Location
Urban/semi-urban 518/1639 (32) 204/1644 (11)
Rural/nomad 1121/1639 (68) 1521/1644 (89)
Male household head 1600/1639 (98) 1449/1644 (88)
Household head primary education or above 687/1588 (43) 265/1365 (19)
Household income sufficient for expenditures 964/1633 (59) 779/1641 (48)
Enough food in house in last week 1067/1621 (66) 810/1622 (50)
In SM district government health services were provided mainly by contracting the Provincial Health Office under the Strengthening Mechanism; in NGO district
the services were provided mainly by a contracted NGO.
Figure 1 Household ratings of available health services in the two districts. In SM district government health services were provided
mainly by contracting the Provincial Health Office under the Strengthening Mechanism; in NGO district the services were provided mainly by a
contracted NGO.
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in level of corruption in health services over the last 12
months in the two districts, among those respondents
who gave an answer to this question. Rather more respon-
dents in the SM district than in the NGO district thought
corruption was increasing. When we asked respondents
about the main forms of corruption they were aware of in
health services, the majority (71% in the SM district, 64%
in the NGO district) were not able or not willing to specify
a type of corruption they were aware of. A minority (4% in
the SM district, 22% in the NGO district) mentioned unof-
ficial payments or bribes.
When asked if anyone in the household had ever been
asked or expected to make an unofficial payment for
health care, some respondents declined to answer: 21%
(349/1639) in the SM district and 11% (185/1644) in the
NGO district. Of those who responded, 85% (1097/1290)
in the SM district and 74% (1078/1459) in the NGO dis-
trict specifically denied anyone in the household had ever
been asked to make an unofficial payment. Some 15%
(193/1290) in the SM district and 26% (381/1459) in the
NGO district admitted that someone in the household
had been asked to make a payment or were unsure if
someone had been asked.
Figure 2 Household views of changes in health services over last 12 months in the two districts. In SM district government health
services were provided mainly by contracting the Provincial Health Office under the Strengthening Mechanism; in NGO district the services were
provided mainly by a contracted NGO.
Table 2 Households’ opinions about changing levels of corruption in health services over the last 12 months in the
two districts
Perceived change in level of corruption Number (weighted %) of household respondents
SM district (n=1497) NGO district (n=1558)
Increasing 266 (18) 120 (8)
Staying the same 480 (32) 600 (39)
Decreasing 383 (26) 422 (27)
Don’t know 368 (25) 416 (26)
In SM district government health services were provided mainly by contracting the Provincial Health Office under the Strengthening Mechanism; in NGO district
the services were provided mainly by a contracted NGO.
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requested to make an unofficial payment said the last time
was within the last month, and most said it was within the
last six months (SM district 78% (24/31) and NGO district
76% (189/249)). In the SM district, the mean unofficial
payment requested on the last occasion was 930.73 (SD
3065.0, n24) Afghani (US$ 19), with a minimum of 10 (US
$ 0.2) and a maximum of 15000 (US$ 299). In the NGO
district, the mean amount requested was 253.67 (SD
252.7, n336) Afghani (US$ 5), with a minimum of 5 (US$
0.1) and a maximum of 2000 (US$ 40).
Participants of the focus groups of men and women sug-
gested that the level of corruption in health services, parti-
cularly in government health services, was probably much
higher than the findings of the household survey indicated.
They said that, in fact, corruption was an everyday experi-
ence in the society, and this was reflected in corruption in
health services, but they felt powerless to do anything
about the corruption. They said people were loath to talk
about corruption in general and their experiences of it in
particular, for fear of the consequences.
“We are afraid the doctor would turn against us if we
were to say anything about this.” (Male group, the SM
district)
“The entire country is corrupt. Doctors are part of it.”
(Male group, the SM district)
“Some people might think that you people are from
the intelligence services. They are afraid of telling you
the truth.” (Female group, the NGO district)
“The entire government is corrupt. Nothing will hap-
pen even if we do complain about it.” (Male group, the
NGO district)
Household use of health services
Nearly two thirds (63%; 1003/1587) of household respon-
dents in the SM district, adjacent to Kabul, reported
household members usually went to a government health
facility to seek help for a health problem, while 36% (569/
1587) said they went to private health facilities. In the
NGO district, further from Kabul, nearly all (93%; 1524/
1630) household respondents said household members
usually went to a government health facility, and just 5%
(87/1630) said they went to private health facilities. In the
SM district, in urban sites, taking other factors into
account in multivariate analysis, households with enough
food in the last week (less poor households) were less
likely to choose a government facility (ORa 0.30, 95%CIca
0.27-0.33), as were households where the head had some
education (ORa 0.49, 95% CIca 0.43-0.56). In the SM dis-
trict rural sites, households were less likely to choose a
government facility if the head had some education (ORa
0.50, 95% CIca 0.26-0.96), and they were more likely to
choose a government health facility if there was one within
5 Km of the community (ORa 1.38, 95% CIca 1.05-1.82).
Focus groups in the SM district pointed to the inadequa-
cies of government facilities as the reason for choosing pri-
vate facilities, and they complained about the attitude of
doctors in government facilities. In the NGO district,
focus groups indicated people went to government rather
than private facilities because they could not afford the
costs of private care, not because the service at govern-
ment facilities was good.
“Government health facilities don’t offer medicine,
competent doctors, gynaecologists, and ambulance ser-
vices. And the doctors are not punctual. That’sw h yw e
go to a private clinic.” (Female group, the SM district)
“If I had money I would not have gone to the govern-
ment clinic. Government clinics are for the poor only.”
(Male group, the NGO district)
Satisfaction of health service users
Nearly all the households who responded to the question
in the SM district (97%; 1515/1560) and the NGO district
(96%; 1414/1476) said at least one household member
had used health services within the last six months. As
expected from the findings (above) about usual type of
facility used, in the SM district, just over half (58%; 905/
1550) of households used a government health facility
the last time a household member sought help for a
health problem, 40% (625/1550) used a private facility,
and 1% (10/1550) used traditional healers. In the NGO
district, by contrast, nearly all (92%; 1472/1605) of house-
holds used a government health facility the last time a
household member sought help for a health problem,
just 7% (110/1605) used a private facility, and 1% (22/
1605) used traditional healers. Among health service
users in the last six months, the majority were female:
59% (833/1459) in the SM district, and 74% (1030/1386)
in the NGO district. In 43% (638/1497) of reported visits
in the SM district and 36% (501/1380) of visits in the
NGO district the person for whom help was sought was
aged less than five years.
Table 3 shows three aspects of service ratings by users:
rating of the reception from the service provider; rating
of the quality of care compared with expectations; and
overall satisfaction with the service. Ratings by govern-
ment service users were similar between the two districts.
Private service users generally gave higher ratings than
government service users, although the small number of
private service users in the NGO district gave lower rat-
ings for some aspects. Table 4 shows the variables related
to three elements of service rating, from the final multi-
variate models. “District” was not significantly associated
with any of the aspects of service rating. A user of a gov-
ernment facility was less likely to rate their reception by
the health worker as good or very good than a user of a
private facility, while service users in urban sites and
those from less poor households were more likely to rate
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facility was less likely to report the care was better than
expected, and less likely to be satisfied with the overall
care. Among users of government health facilities, service
users were less likely to be satisfied overall if they were
from a household with an educated head. They were
more likely to be satisfied overall if their household had
enough food in the last week, if they did not have to wait
more than 30 minutes to be seen, and if they were in an
urban community.
Costs of using health services
Government health service users did not get a free ser-
vice in either of the two districts. Apart from travel costs
to reach the facility, paid by 49% of service users in the
SM district and 77% of service users in the NGO district,
most service users made payments both within the facil-
ities, and outside the facilities to pay for medicines and
investigations. Table 5 summarises the payments
reported by government health service users in the two
districts. A minority paid a small amount for a “ticket” or
registration fee, and about the same small proportion
paid a larger amount for their treatment or investigations
in the facility. Most of the service users in both districts
paid for medicines or further investigations outside the
government facilities, and this was generally their biggest
expense. The reported median amounts paid within the
government facilities were similar to the reported median
amounts paid in private facilities (100 Afghanis, US$ 2),
and the median amounts paid outside the government
facilities approached those reported by users of private
facilities (300 – 350 Afghanis, US$ 6-7).
Focus groups of men and women in the two districts
confirmed that “everyone is aware” o ft h ep o l i c yo ff r e e
treatment in government facilities but they were equally
clear that this policy was not followed in practice. They
described the sorts of things they had to pay for in gov-
ernment health facilities, ranging from a small payment
for the ticket, to payments for medicines, investigations
and procedures. They were aware that some of these
Table 3 Views of health service users in the two districts about the quality of the service they received from
government and private facilities
Views of service users Proportion (weighted %) of service users
SM district NGO district
Government service users
Reception from health worker good or very good 671/836 (80) 968/1258 (76)
Quality of care better than expected 312/837 (37) 604/1257 (48)
Satisfied with overall care 563/841 (67) 845/1258 (67)
Private service users
Reception from health worker good or very good 557/581 (96) 92/99 (93)
Quality of care better than expected 396/580 (68) 36/100 (35)
Satisfied with overall care 487/583 (84) 46/99 (47)
In SM district government health services were provided mainly by contracting the Provincial Health Office under the Strengthening Mechanism; in NGO district
the services were provided mainly by a contracted NGO.
Table 4 Variables related to ratings by service users in the two districts combined, from multivariate models
Rating elements and associated factors Adjusted Odds Ratio (ORa) Cluster adjusted 95% confidence interval (CIca)
(a) Among all service users
Rated reception by health worker as good or very good
User of government health facility 0.18 0.10-0.35
Urban sites 4.10 1.50-11.19
Household had enough food in last week 1.61 1.18-2.20
Care better than expected
User of government health facility 0.45 0.33-0.61
Satisfied with overall care
User of government health facility 0.56 0.40-0.80
(b) Among users of government health facilities
Satisfied with overall care
Household head has some education 0.67 0.53-0.86
Household had enough food in the last week 1.61 1.32-1.98
Waited less than 30 minutes to be seen 2.32 1.57-3.44
Urban sites 2.24 1.01-4.93
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fied the range of people they might have to pay, from the
doorman to the doctor. The groups showed a mixture of
resignation, frustration and anger about the payments
they had to make. They considered that if they did not
pay, they would not receive the treatment.
“They charge 50 Afghanis [US$ 1] for an eye check
up.” (Female group, the NGO district)
“We give bribes to the birth attendant in hospitals.”
(Female group, the SM district)
“W ep a yo n l yd o c t o r sa n dc a r e t a k e r s . ” (Male group,
the SM district)
“We pay all the personnel in the facility.” (Male group,
the NGO district)
Group participants explained that payments for using
government health facilities could pose a serious strain
on family resources. Sometimes they had to take loans
or sell assets in order to find the money.
“If money is not available we have to sell our livestock
or take loans.” (Male group, the SM district)
Discussion
The social audit, collecting information about health ser-
vices from the intended beneficiaries in households, pro-
vided important insights to complement facilities-based
monitoring [10].
Limitations
The demonstration social audit covered only two districts,
purposively selected, and the findings in these two districts
cannot be generalised to the whole country. Access to and
experience of health services in districts further from
Kabul and more affected by the ongoing conflict are likely
to be worse than in the two districts in this study.
Satisfaction ratings are an imprecise measure. Overall
household ratings are affected by a complex mixture of
factors and are susceptible to rapid changes, for example
in response to a negative media report about services or
an e g a t i v ee x p e r i e n c eo faf a m i l ym e m b e ro rn e i g h b o u r .
Satisfaction ratings based on a specific recent contact
with health services are likely to be less affected than
household satisfaction ratings by external factors, but still
result from a mixture of personal and service factors, and
the interplay between them. Prior experience and expec-
tations make a difference.
Household perceptions and use of services
Most households relied on government health facilities,
run under contract by an NGO or under the SM, for
treatment of health problems. A notably higher propor-
tion of households in the SM district (over a third) than
in the NGO district (less than 10 percent) reported they
usually used a private health facility for treatment of a
health problem. This probably reflects the greater access
in the SM district to the private facilities in Kabul. In
both districts, discussions in focus groups suggested that
more households would use private facilities if they could
afford to do so, because they believed the quality of care
in private facilities would be better. In the SM district,
where we could analyse this, the better off households
(those with enough food and those with a head that had
some education) were indeed more likely to use private
facilities. In rural parts of the district, access made a dif-
ference, and households were more likely to choose a
government facility if there was one nearby. The greater
use of private health care by those households that can
afford it is in line with the findings of other studies in the
region. A 2004-5 survey in Afghanistan also found that
better off households were more likely to make use of
private health care services [11]. In Pakistan and Bangla-
desh, nationally representative surveys found that many
households chose private health service providers over
government facilities, and more said they would do so if
they could afford it [12-14].
The rating of available health services by households
across the two districts included both government and
private services available to them. Those households with
enough food in the last week were more likely to rate ser-
vices positively; this perhaps reflects their greater ability
to access services, as well as perhaps better treatment in
those services they do access. In the focus group discus-
sions two common themes were “poor people have no
Table 5 Payments made by government health service users in the two districts
Item Proportion (weighted %) paying and median amount in Afghani (US$)*
SM district NGO district
“Ticket” or registration fee 82/838 (10)
5.00 (0.1)
386/1262 (31)
5.00 (0.1)
Treatment and investigations in facility 113/838 (14)
100.00 (2)
211/1262 (17)
100.00 (2)
Medicines etc outside the facility 695/832 (83)
200.00 (4)
895/1249 (72)
250.00 (5)
*The median amount is among those who paid anything.
In SM district government health services were provided mainly by contracting the Provincial Health Office under the Strengthening Mechanism; in NGO district
the services were provided mainly by a contracted NGO.
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government health services”.
In multivariate analyses examining the effects of both
individual and service factors, we attempted to tease out
the factors associated with ratings by service users. All rat-
ings were more positive among users of private health
facilities. Among government service users, overall satis-
faction was related to a mixture of personal factors and
services factors: a shorter waiting time increased the
chances of being satisfied, and users from less poor house-
holds were more likely to be satisfied. The higher satisfac-
tion in urban areas might reflect other service factors that
were better in urban clinics than in rural clinics. Interest-
ingly, users from households with a head who had some
education were less likely to be satisfied; perhaps they look
for higher standards. A study based on data collected from
primary health care facilities in Afghanistan in 2004 found
that poorer service users got better quality of service in
NGO-contracted facilities than directly managed govern-
ment facilities [15].
User ratings of services, put together with information
from services themselves, can be a useful barometer over
time of how services are performing and serving the needs
and wishes of the population. Used carefully, such ratings
can be part of the way of assessing the quality of service
overall and the quality of service from different service
providers.
Costs of using health services
In a poor country such as Afghanistan, costs of health ser-
vices are a crucial consideration. Often the main costs
considered are those borne by the service providers, yet
out of pocket costs to service users are important. They
limit access to services by the poorest households, and
lead to frustration and resentment among service users
and non-users. According to official policy in Afghanistan,
services in government health facilities (including those
run directly by the MOPH, and those run by the SM or by
a contracted NGO) were provided free of charge in 2008.
However, in practice those who used government health
services in our study often had to bear considerable direct
monetary costs, in addition to such costs as loss of work
time for daily wage earners (Table 5). The costs were simi-
lar between the district with government services run
under the SM and the district with government services
provided by a contracted NGO, and are comparable with
those reported from a previous survey in Afghanistan [11].
In the context of a supposedly free service, the reported
costs are considerable in Afghanistan, the poorest coun-
try in the Asia and Pacific region and where 42% of the
population are below the national poverty line [16].
Although focus groups voiced the perception that poor
people are forced to use government services, the costs
of treatment and investigations in government facilities,
among those who paid, were the same as these costs in
private facilities. The costs outside the facility (mainly for
medicines) among users of government services were not
much less than those incurred by users of private ser-
vices. The costs were not less for facilities run by con-
tracted NGOs than those run by the provincial health
office under the SM. The focus group discussions con-
firmed that health care costs can place a serious strain on
already precarious family finances; people have to take
loans or sell livestock to find the money. These findings
suggest that a review of actual charges in government
health facilities is needed, especially as most of these
charges are apparently not officially sanctioned.
Corruption in health services
Although the focus group discussions made it clear that
people understood the payments they made in govern-
ment health facilities were unofficial, household respon-
dents were loath to talk about corruption in health
services, declining to answer the questions about this, or
responding that they “knew nothing about it”. Especially in
the SM district, a sizeable minority of respondents could
not or would not answer questions about the types of cor-
ruption they knew about, or their own family’s experience
of being asked for unofficial payments or bribes. The fear
associated with talking about corruption that emerged
from the focus groups is a cause for concern. This climate
of fear and suspicion allows corruption to flourish and can
thwart attempts to tackle the problem. Afghanis see cor-
ruption in the health services as part of the overall high
level of corruption in their country, about which there is
considerable international concern [17]. Afghanistan was
rated the third most corrupt country in the world in 2010
[18]. On a positive note, tackling corruption in health ser-
vices is probably easier and less dangerous than tackling
corruption in, for example, the police or justice services,
and it could provide a starting point for a more general
campaign against corruption.
Conclusions
The social audit process was feasible, at least in the two
districts included in this study, and produced some
actionable findings. The majority of households used
contracted government health services but preferred pri-
vate services. Although people made unofficial payments
in government facilities, run by either the provincial
health office or an NGO, households were loath to dis-
cuss corruption, fearing the consequences. Tackling cor-
ruption in health services is an important part of anti-
corruption measures in Afghanistan.
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